Read Before the Hamilton Library Association, Carlisle, Pa., October 23, 1908, and Reprinted for the Historical Department.
When it is considered by the highest and best authorities that it requires three years to transform a recruit into a good cavalryman, it can be understood why at the opening of the Rebellion, the authorities at Washington hesitated about organizing a mounted arm of the service.
The dash of the Confederate Black Horse Cavalry, at Bull Run, demonstrated the importance of cavalry and when the call for three—year troops was made, it was decided with some reluctance and hesitation to create a small mounted force.
The number at first mustered was too small to be of much value and until the winter of 1862-3, the government did not fully realize the importance of providing an independent and sufficient cavalry force. An organization was then perfected that thereafter proved efficient and effective.
Notwithstanding the inattention first given this arm of the service and the many disadvantages it had to contend with, being divided and sub-divided and assigned in detachments to different corps and division headquarters, some good results were obtained.
It may be conceded that the want of organization at first proved of advantage in the end, for the reason that the field and line officers having to act independently and rely upon their own judgment became self—reliant, and were educated to exercise a due discretion in all emergencies, and not depend entirely on their superiors, who very often could not be reached. An opportunity was also afforded the men to gain or lose confidence in their immediate commanders.
Companies of citizens intended for cavalry, as they arrived at Washington were armed, equipped, mounted and sent across the Potomac to different division headquarters, regimental organizations being delayed until late in the fall. To convert these citizens. unaccustomed to the care of a horse and inexperienced in the use of arms, into cavalrymen in time for the Spring campaign could not he expected; but the patient and persistent hard work performed by Generals Stoneman, P. St. George, Cook, Grier (known as old Billy Grier) Averill, Gregg, Pleasanton and those chieftains who in the early stages of the war were assigned to this work, and the weeding out of incompetent officers brought about a state of efficiency not equalled in the same space of time.
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